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Abstract
This paper quanties the welfare consequences of the medical arms race in the con-
text of MRI adoption. We build and estimate a model of the vertical structure of
the industry where MRI manufacturers sell high- and low-quality MRIs in the up-
stream market, whereas medical institutions provide medical services to patients in
the downstream market. Simulation results suggest that the current free-entry policy
in Japan leads to excess MRI adoption. Furthermore, regulating medical institutions'
MRI adoption, taxing MRI purchases, or softening competition among MRI manufac-
turers would increase social welfare substantially by mitigating the business-stealing
eect in the downstream market.
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1 Introduction
The medical arms race, the proliferation of expensive medical technology and devices, has
caused signicant concern about increasing healthcare expenditures in many countries. To
attract patients, medical institutions adopt new technology as long as the benet exceeds
the cost of adoption. From a social welfare point of view, however, such competition among
medical institutions may result in unnecessary duplication of costly medical devices. This
paper examines this potential ineciency arising from the medical arms race in the context
of adoption of magnetic resonance imaging scanners (hereinafter MRIs), as MRIs are among
the most expensive medical devices and MRI adoption is frequently cited as an example of
the medical arms races (e.g., Baker, 2010; Sari, 2007; Schmidt-Dengler, 2006).
Figure 1: The number of MRIs per million residents across OECD countries
An international comparison of the number of MRIs per million residents across OECD
countries in Figure 1 gives us insight into the relationship between the medical arms race
and healthcare regulation. As shown in the gure, the top two countries are Japan and
the U.S. Both have far more MRIs per million people than the OECD average which is
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13.2, whereas European countries, such as France and Germany, have fewer MRIs per capita
than the OECD average. One of the most important distinctions between these two types
of countries is the existence of regulation on the adoption of expensive medical devices to
mitigate medical arms races. Medical institutions in Japan and the U.S. can decide whether
to adopt an MRI based on their own assessments, whereas many European countries regulate
MRI adoption. These observations immediately raise questions about whether the medical
arms races in Japan and the U.S. create unnecessary duplication of costly medical devices,
and whether regulations in European countries achieve socially ecient allocation of MRIs.
Regulations that are not optimally designed may result in underprovision of MRIs. On
the other hand, in the absence of regulation, medical institutions may adopt more than
the socially optimal number of MRIs, as theoretically shown in Mankiw and Whinston
(1986). They consider a free-entry model with xed cost of entry and show that there is a
tendency toward excessive entry due to the business-stealing eect. Their model is potentially
applicable to the MRI industry in countries without regulation, because, in these countries,
medical institutions can provide MRI-associated services upon purchasing an MRI, which
can be viewed as free entry with large xed cost. In fact, Chandra and Skinner (2012) note
that overprovision of MRIs might occur without regulation and suggest the use of regulation
to mitigate excessive adoption. We therefore empirically examine the welfare consequences
of MRI adoption with and without regulation.
The framework developed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986), however, is not sucient
when considering the MRI industry, as it does not model the upstream market, i.e., com-
petition among MRI manufacturers. If the upstream market is a monopoly and there is
no competition, the monopolistic MRI manufacturer has an incentive to set high prices for
MRIs, which impedes MRI adoption. On the other hand, if the upstream market is perfectly
competitive, the MRI prices approach the marginal cost, which facilitates MRI adoption.
Thus, the excessiveness or insuciency of the adoption in the downstream market depends
crucially on the mark-ups that the upstream rms charge. The dierences between mark-ups
in Japan and in the U.S. suggest that competition among MRI manufacturers aects medical
institutions' adoption of MRIs. The number of MRI manufacturers in Japan is greater than
that in the U.S. and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission documented in 2004 that the price
of MRIs in Japan was 25% lower than the price in the U.S.1 The lower price in Japan may
have been a consequence of severe competition in the upstream market, which accelerates
1There are ve MRI manufacturers operating in the U.S., whereas there is one additional domestic rm
in addition to those ve rms operating in Japan.
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the medical arms race. To assess the welfare implications of the medical arms race, therefore,
we explicitly model the upstream market where MRI manufacturers sell MRIs to medical
institutions.
To proceed to the empirical analysis, we construct a novel dataset that contains a com-
plete list of medical institutions, the characteristics of the MRIs that each medical institution
owns, the number of patients treated in each medical institution, the patients' co-payments
and the reimbursement amount for medical institutions in Japan. Although our general
framework is not restricted to the study of the Japanese market, there are two advantages
that make the Japanese market more appealing than the U.S. for this analysis. First, medi-
cal prices are regulated by the government in Japan; thus, patient co-payments and medical
institution reimbursements can be perfectly observed, which is crucial for welfare analysis.
On the other hand, in the U.S., it is hard to obtain the data on co-payment for each patient
and the reimbursement price for medical institutions, due to the lack of a unied health
insurance system. Second, in our Japanese data, we observe the number of patients, which
is a key variable in quantifying the business-stealing eects of MRI adoption, from a random
sample of all medical institutions that oer MRI scans. In the U.S., other institutions besides
hospitals (such as freestanding imaging centers) provide MRI scanning service, which makes
it dicult for researchers to assess the number of patients treated there.
In the empirical analysis, we build and estimate a vertical industry model. In the up-
stream market, MRI manufacturers compete in quantity and medical institutions strategi-
cally decide whether to adopt an MRI or not. In the downstream market, MRI-equipped
medical institutions provide MRI scanning services for patients and patients decide whether
to visit a medical institution and if so, which one. The number of patients helps us identify
the parameters for MRI scanning demand, whereas free-entry conditions for medical institu-
tions and optimality conditions for MRI manufacturers help us identify the parameters for
MRI production cost.
The estimated parameters are then used to conduct counterfactual simulations in order
to quantify the eect of potential policy interventions. Motivated by Figure 1, we rst
hypothetically introduce French-style regulation which limits the number of MRIs per million
people in each region. We consider three scenarios: one having the same limit as France's
regulation (7.5 MRIs per million people) and two levels of looser regulation (10 and 23
MRIs per million people).2 In all scenarios, consumer surplus would decrease because fewer
medical institutions would adopt MRIs and consumers' hospital choices would be limited. On
2We assume that market share stays the same under this hypothetical regulation.
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the other hand, MRI producer surplus would increase because the business-stealing eects
are mitigated.3 The change in producer surplus would outweigh the change in consumer
surplus, leading to an increase in social welfare. Second, we hypothetically introduce a sales
tax on MRIs, as entry taxes and licensing fees are frequently discussed as eective policy
interventions in the literature on free entry. Our results indicate that such a sales tax with
an appropriate redistribution of tax revenue would be Pareto improving.
We further examine the eect of upstream market competition on social welfare by con-
sidering two hypothetical cases. First, all MRI manufacturers proportionally reduce their
quantity to maximize the industry prot, keeping their current market shares constant. Sec-
ond, all manufacturers hypothetically merge, allowing for production reallocation. The rst
scenario would yield similar results to those generated by French-style regulation. Even
though allowing a cartel is anti-competitive, social welfare would increase as MRI producers
internalized business-stealing eects in the downstream market. This nding reveals a mech-
anism that determines how upstream market competition aects social welfare and provides
new insight into antitrust policies. In the second scenario, we observe further improvement
in social welfare due to production reallocation. By allowing MRI manufacturers to real-
locate their production, they are able to further internalize business-stealing eects among
products.
This paper is related to the growing literature of health economics, in particular, the liter-
ature focusing on new technology adoption and the medical arms race. Existing papers such
as Baker (2001) and Baker and Phibbs (2002) suggest the existence of strategic interaction
among hospitals and of ineciency that arises from the medical arms race. Schmidt-Dengler
(2006) introduces a structural approach to show that the business-stealing eect is one im-
portant source of ineciencies. However, the existing literature lacks welfare analysis due to
the limited availability of patient-level data. To the best of our knowledge, Zabinski (2014)
is the rst to attempt to quantify social welfare using data from the robotic surgery industry.
Our paper expands the literature by examining how regulations aect social welfare; we also
quantify the welfare consequences of the medical arms race.
This paper also makes a substantial contribution to the literature on rms' entry and
vertical markets. The empirical literature on rms' entry such as Berry and Waldfogel
(1999) and Maruyama (2011) builds upon Mankiw and Whinston (1986), and recent papers
have enriched the model by incorporating quality choices as in Mazzeo (2002) and dynamic
3In the model, we assume zero-prot conditions for the medical institutions. Therefore, social welfare is
dened by the sum of consumer welfare and the MRI producer surplus.
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incentive as in Jia and Pathak (2015). We add a new perspective to the literature, namely
the vertical structure of markets, the structure that Ghosh and Morita (2007) theoretically
study.4 Introduction of the vertical structure of markets may reverse welfare implications
in the existing literature both theoretically and empirically. Our modeling framework also
contributes to the literature of vertical markets. The recent literature has extensively studied
how competition aects social welfare in markets with vertical structure. Many existing
papers, including Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Ho and Lee (2015) and Villas-Boas (2007),
have emphasized negotiations among upstream and downstream rms, whereas our paper
focuses on how the degree of upstream market competition aects downstream rms' entry
and social welfare.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional background and
our novel data, and provides some summary statistics and motivating facts for the modeling
framework. Section 3 then provides a theoretical model, which provokes our empirical study,
and an empirical model, which is customized to study the data we have in hand. We discuss
empirical implementation and identication in Section 4. The estimation results and the
counterfactual simulation are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Data
In order to motivate our model, this section rst provides a brief overview of the health care
system and the MRI industry in Japan. After that, we describe our data.
2.1 Background
Health Care System in Japan Since 1961, Japan has had universal health coverage
(like many OECD countries), which implies that every citizen in Japan is insured. Roughly
speaking, there are two types of insurance programs available in Japan and they depend on
the citizen's employer. If a citizen's employer oers its own insurance program, then he/she
must enroll in it. This is called \Employee Health Insurance" (Kenko-Hoken). Otherwise
people enroll in so-called \National Health Insurance" (Kokumin-Kenko-Hoken). Regardless
of their insurance programs, when the insured (patients) receive medical services at med-
ical institutions, the patients must pay 30% of the health care fee and the rest should be
4Our model is similar to that of Ghosh and Morita (2007) in the sense that both incorporate vertical
structure into Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Ghosh and Morita (2007) consider free entry in the upstream
market with a xed number of downstream rms, whereas we focus on the eect of upstream market com-
petition given free entry in the downstream market.
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covered by their insurers.5 The Japanese health care system has several notable features:
(i) \free access," (ii) fee-for-service (FFS) payment, and (iii) a lack of regulation of medical
institutions' adoption of MRIs.
First and most importantly, Japanese patients have \free access", which means that they
are allowed to go to any medical institution in Japan, unlike the U.S. system which only
allows patients to go to medical institutions belonging to their health insurers' network.
Thus, except in a few rare cases, patients can choose to go to whichever medical institution
they like, in principle. Furthermore, unlike countries such as France, the U.K., and the
Netherlands, there is no general practitioner system in Japan and thus it is common for
people to go directly to specialized medical institutions when they get sick. This aspect is
particularly relevant to the model presented in Section 3, because patients' choice of medical
institution does not depend on home doctors' advice but rather on their own preference.
Second, health care fees are regulated in Japan and are set by the government with bian-
nual revisions. In a fee-for-service (FFS) payment system, medical treatments are unbundled
and patients must pay for each medical treatment.6 Medical institutions are formally divided
into two main categories in Japan: hospitals and clinics. The distinction depends entirely
on the number of beds. If a medical institution has less than 20 beds, it is classied as a
clinic. Otherwise, it is called a hospital. About 80% of hospitals and around 95% of clinics
are privately owned, which enables us to safely assume that medical institutions maximize
their prots in our model. Even though there is such wide variation in medical institutions'
patient capacity, the insured must pay, in principle, the same fees for the same medical
treatment in Japan, regardless of their medical institution choices.
Lastly, there are neither regulations nor subsidies aecting medical institutions' MRI
adoption. According to Ho, Ku-Goto and Jollis (2009), the U.S. is in a similar situation
where there is no eective regulation on MRI adoption. On the other hand, France and
Germany have regional restrictions to discourage excessive adoption of expensive medical
equipment (see Konig (1998) for details of the regulations).
The MRI Industry in Japan MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) is one of the medical
imaging techniques that enables the scanning of body tissues. In particular, it is a useful
5There are some exceptions. For example, if patients are more than 70 years old, their co-payment is
20%. Furthermore, insurers subsidize some expensive medical treatments.
6As of 2015, some hospitals have started using the DPC (Diagnosis Procedure Combination) payment
system, because the Japanese government encourages hospitals to shift to DPC in order to reduce medical
expenses. However, the time period that our sample comes from is 2008 and at that time most medical
institutions used fee-for-service payment.
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tool for identifying diseases in the brain, other organs and soft tissues. MRIs use magnetic
elds and radio waves and thus, naturally, one of the most important characteristics of an
MRI is the eld strength of its magnet, which is measured in tesla. Although there are some
exceptions, a higher-tesla machine is basically better than one with lower tesla, because a
higher-tesla machice allows doctors to take higher-quality images in less time. Although
the most popular MRI is a 1.5-tesla machine, the eld strength varies by machine, typically
ranging from 0.2 to 3 tesla. In the MRI treatment market, the regulated reimbursement
price depends on the MRI's tesla. If an MRI's magnetic strength is 1.5 tesla or higher,
medical institutions typically receive around 23,400 JPY for each treatment. Otherwise, the
reimbursement price is 19,200 JPY.7 Thus, the average patient whose co-payment is 30%
must pay approximately 7,000 JPY (60 USD) for a high-tesla MRI scanning service and
5,800 JPY (49 USD) for a low-tesla MRI scanning service.8
There are six MRI manufacturers operating in Japan; Five of them are globally oper-
ated and one of them is domestically operated. The ve global MRI producers include
GE Healthcare Japan (GE), Hitachi Medical Corp. (Hitachi), Philips Electronics Japan
(Philips), Siemens Healthcare Japan (Siemens) and Toshiba Medical Systems (Toshiba).
The single domestic producer is Shimadzu Corp (Shimadzu).9 Even though MRI machines
are among the most expensive pieces of medical equipment, it seems that the Japanese
market oers relatively lower prices due to severe price competition induced by the three
Japanese manufacturers { Hitachi, Shimadzu and Toshiba. In fact, the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (2005) documented that the average MRI price in Japan was about 25% lower
than the price in the U.S., and the U.S. price is typically much lower than that in EU coun-
tries. This industry structure could be one of the reasons why there are so many MRIs in
Japan.
2.2 Data
Data Overview The datasets used in this paper come from various sources. First of all,
we obtained a complete list of hospitals in Japan based on a series of books, Byouin Jyouhou
7The reimbursement prices are imputed in the following way. First, if the MRI eld strength is less than
1.5 tesla, the sum of the fee for undergoing an MRI scan and the standard consultation fee is 19,200 JPY. For
high-tesla MRI, the fees typically include more components and it is not clear how to calculate the average
reimbursement price. Thus, we calibrate these high-tesla fees by matching the average reimbursement prices
to those reported in Imai, Ogawa, Tamura and Imamura (2012).
81 USD = 117.4 JPY as of January 19, 2016.
9Shimadzu was also globally operated but the rm halted its sales of MRI scanners outside the Japanese
market in 1999 and has not resumed them.
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Table 1: MRI Ownership by Medical Institution Type
No Owning MRI
MRI Low High Total
Hospitals
Large ( 100 beds) 494 813 1,366 2,673
Small (< 100 beds) 5,001 906 286 6,193
Sub Total 5,495 1,719 1,652 8,866
Clinics (Only neurology, neurosurgery and orthopedics)
12,958 1,115 252 14,325
Total 18,453 2,834 1,904 23,191
Note: This table represents the number of medical institutions without and with low-
and high-tesla MRIs by the category of medical institutions. The category \Clinics"
only includes the clinics that focus on neurology, neurosurgery, and orthopedics, as
these clinics are the main users of MRIs.
(Hospital Information), with help of Freeill Corp, and a complete list of clinics that focus on
neurosurgery, neurology and orthopedics in Japan. Second, we manually collected a complete
list of medical institutions that own at least one MRI based on a series of monthly-published
books, Gekkan Shin Iryo (New Medical Care). Third, we also used a survey of medical
institutions, asking which model of MRI they own, the timing of their purchases, reasons for
purchasing, utilization of their MRIs, and so on. Roughly 20% of the medical institutions
that own MRIs responded and Hashimoto and Bessho (2011) show that the samples represent
the population well. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that samples are drawn randomly.
Finally, the municipality-level average income and population data are obtained from the
2010 census, as the Japanese government conducts a census every ve years and the 2010
census is closest in time to the year our MRI data was collected.
Descriptive Statistics Table 1 shows, by institution type, the number of Japanese med-
ical institutions that own low- and high-tesla MRIs or no MRIs. This paper only deals with
the medical institutions that potentially adopt MRIs. Therefore, we use all hospitals in Japan
and all clinics that focus on neurosurgery, neurology and orthopedics. As demonstrated in
the rst row, there are 2,673 large hospitals in Japan. Among them, 1,366 hospitals, more
than half of them, own at least one high-quality MRI and 813 hospitals have a low-quality
MRI. This pattern is completely reversed for small hospitals and clinics. Most of them do
not own high-quality MRIs, though a non-negligible portion of them still have low-quality
MRIs.
9
Next, Figure 2 depicts the market share. Though there are some dierences in selling
low-quality MRIs, four global MRI manufacturers produce very similar numbers of high-
quality MRIs. In contrast, Hitachi, one of the global MRI manufacturers, has the largest
share among six MRI producers and almost 99% of Hitachi's share comes from the sales
of low-quality MRIs, when decomposing Hitachi's market share into the low-quality and
high-quality segments. A similar pattern is observed in the market share composition for
Shimadzu. Notice that the global market share looks slightly dierent from this graph. In
many OECD countries, GE, Philips and Siemens each account for 25% of the market share,
respectively, whereas Toshiba typically accounts for 10 to 15% and Hitachi accounts for
5%. Thus, Japan's unique market share structure could be due to the severe competition in
Japan, in particular for the segment of low-quality MRIs.
Figure 2: MRI Market Share in Japan
Note: This gure represents the number of MRIs sold by each MRI manufacturer. Gray bars indicate
the sales for low-tesla MRIs, while black bars indicate the sales for high-tesla MRIs.
Third, Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the relationship between the number of MRIs and
population for each market. Here we dene the market as a geographically distinct medical
administration area, called Niji-Iryoken, based on the Medical Care Act, excepting some
large cities (cities designated by government ordinance and 23 Tokyo special districts) where
we use municipalities for the market denition.10 There are about 1,700 municipalities in
10These denitions are based on an approximation of patients' behavior. In large cities, there are sucient
choices nearby and thus people tend to go to local hospitals. On the other hand, in rural areas, there are
not many medical institutions nearby and thus people tend to choose medical institutions that cover larger
geographical areas, which correspond to the medical administration areas.
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Japan and our process results in 523 markets. The gure suggests there is a linear relationship
between the logarithm of population and the logarithm of the number of MRIs, implying
that the population is one of the most important determinants for the number of MRIs
in the market. Although the average income is another important factor that aects MRI
adoption, it aects the proportion of low- and high-quality MRIs purchased rather than the
the total number of MRIs in the market, as indicated in Panel (b) of Figure 3. Even though
the slope is not very steep, it is still positive and statistically signicant, which suggests that
high-quality MRIs are preferred by high-income people and medical institutions take this
preference into account when purchasing MRIs.
Figure 3: The Eects of Population and Income on MRI Adoption
Note: Panel (a) shows the relationship between the logarithm of population and the logarithm of the number
of MRIs in each market. Panel (b) shows the relationship between the logarithm of average income and
the fraction of high-tesla MRIs in each market. Each dot represents one market. In each panel, using a
non-parametric approximation, we show the tted value as a black solid line and the 95% condence interval
as a shaded region.
Lastly, Figure 4 shows the utilization rates for high- and low-quality MRIs. Utilization is
dened as the number of patients treated per week divided by the physical capacity of a MRI
scanner.11 Panel (a) demonstrates the utilization rates of medical institutions adopting high-
11We compute that the physical capacity of an MRI scanner is 132 per week, assuming that medical
11
quality MRIs, whereas Panel (b) demonstrates the utilization rates of medical institutions
adopting low-quality MRIs. Each dot denotes a medical institution, while the horizontal and
vertical axes shows the logarithm of population of the market where the medical institution is
located and the utilization rate, respectively. There are two important observations. First,
in both panels, medical institutions do not fully utilize their MRIs, suggesting that MRI
adoption could be excessive in Japan because the same number of patients could be treated
with fewer MRIs. Furthermore, the utilization rates of low-quality MRIs are lower than
those of high-quality MRIs, which may reect the fact that low-quality MRIs are relatively
cheap compared to high-quality MRIs and even these low utilization rates are enough to
cover the adoption costs. In fact, the average numbers of patients for high- and low-tesla
MRIs per week are 64.2 and 34.9, respectively, implying that the average utilization rates
for them are 48.6% and 26.4%, respectively. Second, even though the total number of MRI
scans increases in population, the utilization rates are roughly constant. As the population
increases, the total number of MRIs also increases as in Figure 3, which makes the utilization
rates nearly constant regardless of the population.
3 The Model
The goal of this section is twofold. The rst goal is to develop a theoretical model of a
vertical industry with free entry in the downstream market and show that the social e-
ciency of the whole economy hinges on the degree of competition in the upstream market.
More specically, we prove that (i) when the upstream market is monopolized, social wel-
fare is improved by increasing the degree of upstream market competition, and (ii) when
the upstream market is perfectly competitive, social welfare is improved by decreasing the
degree of upstream market competition. The second goal is to develop and present an em-
pirically tractable model, which we later use with the data. Though the intuition behind our
theoretical and empirical models is the same, as is their takeaway message, the theoretical
model is dierent from the empirical model with respect to (i) the downstream prices and
(ii) the heterogeneity in both products and rms. Regarding the downstream prices, even
though the medical price is xed in Japan as explained in the previous section, our theo-
retical model allows the downstream price to be an equilibrium outcome of the competition
of downstream rms. On the other hand, our empirical model includes rich heterogeneity
in upstream and downstream products and cost structures, whereas our theoretical model
institutions operate 8 hours per day, 5.5 business days per week, and that each scan takes approximately 20
minutes.
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Figure 4: Utilization Rates for MRIs
Note: Panel (a) shows the relationship between the logarithm of population and the utilization rate of
high-tesla MRIs at each medical institution. Panel (b) shows the relationship between the logarithm of
population and the utilization rate of low-tesla MRIs at each medical institution. Each dot represents one
medical institution. In each panel, using a non-parametric approximations, we show the tted value as a
black solid line and the 95% condence interval as a shaded region.
considers a homogeneous environment to derive clear analytical results. Readers who are
interested in empirical analysis can proceed directly to Section 3.2.
3.1 The Theoretical Model
We consider an industry that consists of an upstream market and a downstream market.
The upstream rms produce an intermediate product which is required for the downstream
rms to produce the nal product for consumers. In our MRI context, the upstream rms
are MRI manufacturers that produce MRIs as intermediate products and the downstream
rms are medical institutions that provide MRI scanning services for patients. We consider
the following three-stage game. In the rst stage, Nu identical upstream rms, a nite and
xed number, simultaneously decide the quantity of a homogeneous intermediate product.
All upstream rms possess exactly the same production technology, which is characterized
by the linear cost function cu(q) = Kq, where K is xed and constant. In the second
stage, the price of the intermediate product pu is realized and a large (innite) number
13
of identical potential entrants make their entry decisions.12 Upon entry, each downstream
rm purchases one unit of intermediate product which costs pu and thereby obtains access
to a technology. This is characterized by the cost function cd(q). We assume that cd() is
continuous, cd(0) = 0, c
0
d()  0, and c00d()  0 for all q  0. Lastly, in the third stage,
these downstream rms that enter the market play an oligopoly game, for which we do not
specify the mode of competition. This model is a natural extension of that of Mankiw and
Whinston (1986), which does not consider the upstream market. They treat the entry costs
as exogenously given and xed, whereas our model endogenizes the entry cost of downstream
rms as an equilibrium result of competition among upstream rms.
We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. In the third
stage, given that Nd rms have entered the nal product market in the second stage, we
assume that the equilibrium is symmetric and denote q(Nd) to be the equilibrium output per
downstream rm. Knowing what would happen if Nd rms entered the nal product market
and given the rst stage total production quantity, Qu, we assume that the equilibrium
intermediate product price pu is characterized by the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Free-Entry Equilibrium) Suppose Qu is the aggregate output in the rst
stage and P () denotes the inverse demand function in the nal product market, then
P (Qu  q(Qu))  q(Qu)  cd(q(Qu))  pu = 0:
This assumption corresponds to the free-entry assumption in Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
and states that all rms obtain exactly zero prot in a free-entry equilibrium.13 Since each
entry requires one unit of intermediate product, the number of entrants must be equal to
the aggregate output of the intermediate product Qu in an equilibrium. Given the aggregate
output Qu, what would happen in the third stage can be rationally expected and Qu  q(Qu)
will be the total nal production amount in the third stage. The rst term, therefore, is the
revenue of each downstream rm and the second term is the production cost, whereas the
third term represents the entry cost. This assumption also guarantees the market clearing
for the intermediate product by having the price of the intermediate product equal the prot
earned by the entrants in the third stage.
12Though we do not explicitly specify the exact mechanism that determines prices here, this price deter-
mination can be through negotiation or bargaining.
13Having exactly zero prot may seem to be a strong assumption because the typical free-entry conditions
simply state that the marginal entrant obtains non-negative prot and no additional entry is protable. We
discuss this issue later when we describe our empirical model.
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Social Welfare and Competition in the Upstream Market We begin our analysis
by dening social welfare as a function of the number of upstream rms, Nu. For the sake
of the tractability of our analysis, we ignore the integer problem and treat the number
of rms as continuous like Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Given all primitives, we rst
characterize the equilibrium aggregate output of the intermediate product. Since the rst
stage is quantity competition with symmetric rms, the equilibrium must be symmetric and,
therefore, Qu = Nu  qu, where qu denotes the output per upstream rm. The equilibrium
production quantity is characterized by the rst-order condition given by
@pu
@Qu
qu + pu  K = 0:
Now, we can dene social welfare as a function of the number of upstream rms, which
is given by
W (Nu) =
Z Quq(Qu)
0
P (s)ds Qu  c(q(Qu)) Qu K
subject to Qu = Nu  qu and @pu
@Qu
qu + pu  K = 0:
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and MW1-3, which are the assumptions on the
downstream market and the same as those in Mankiw and Whinston (1986), in Appendix A
hold. If the upstream market is monopolized by one rm, then
@W
@Nu
> 0:
Moreover, if the price in the upstream market is equal to the marginal cost, then
@W
@Nu
 0 if pu = K with strict inequality if p(Qu  q(Qu))  c0(q(Qu)) > 0:
Proof: See Appendix A.
This proposition states that the number of downstream rms is socially insucient if the
upstream market is a monopoly, and socially excessive if the upstream market is perfectly
competitive. The result suggests that, even in a very simple homogeneous setting like that
of Mankiw and Whinston (1986), the suciency or excessiveness depends on the degree of
competition in the upstream market. It also suggests that ignoring the upstream market
would overestimate ineciency. Furthermore, as argued in Mankiw and Whinston (1986),
product dierentiation may reverse this bias toward excessive entry and make theoretical
prediction ambiguous. In the next subsection, therefore, we build a suciently rich model
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that captures important features of the MRI industry: its vertical structure, the heterogene-
ity of both upstream and downstream rms and product dierentiation among MRIs, which
are the key components of the welfare analysis.
3.2 The Empirical Model
Given our motivation and institutional background, this section describes a structural model
that explicitly takes into account the vertical structure of the MRI industry. Our model has
three sets of players: (i) MRI manufacturers that produce high- and low-quality MRIs and
compete in quantities in each geographical market, (ii) medical institutions, namely hospitals
and clinics, that purchase MRIs to oer medical services for patients in the downstream
market, and (iii) patients who need to undergo MRI scans to nd and cure their diseases.
In order to formally describe our model, we rst introduce several notations. Each ge-
ographical market is denoted by a subscript m 2 M and characterized by its population,
popm, and the average weekly income level, ym. Following the standard denition used by
the Japanese government, the medical institutions are categorized into three sets, fc; s; lg,
where c denotes clinics that have less than 20 beds, s denotes small hospitals that have less
than 100 beds, and l denotes large hospitals that have 100 beds or more. Each MRI pro-
ducer f 2 F sells two types of MRI, q 2 fL;Hg, where L denotes low-tesla MRIs (less than
1.5 tesla) and H denotes high-tesla MRIs (1.5 tesla or higher). This simplication tremen-
dously eases computational complexity, but still introduces sucient product dierentiation,
because these two types of MRI correspond to the reimbursement rates, as is explained in
Section 2.
MRI manufacturers play Cournot competition in each geographical market. Although it
is natural to use a dierentiated product approach in a continuous fashion, such an approach
introduces a complication in the second stage adoption game played by medical institutions.
Thus, to keep the empirical tractability, we introduce the concept of a segment, which is
dened as a Cartesian product of hospital types and MRI types, and is described in Table
2. This segmentation captures the dierentiation in a discrete fashion and means that from
consumers', hospitals' and MRI manufacturers' perspectives, they can at least distinguish
among MRIs with dierent tesla ratings, dierent hospital types, and the combination of
these. From consumers' perspective, each MRI scan is dierentiated by the characteristics
of the MRI and those of the hospital. From the medical institutions' perspective, each
institution has three choices: to adopt a high-tesla MRI, to adopt a low-tesla MRI or to stay
out of the MRI treatment market. Hospitals make their decisions strategically based on their
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characteristics and the perceived dierentiation among consumers. Given this structure, MRI
manufacturers and hospitals treat MRIs in dierent segments dierently. MRI manufacturers
also strategically decide what quantity to supply in each segment. The price of an MRI can
dier in each segment.
Table 2: Concept of Segment
Hospitals
Clinics Small Large
(c) (s) (l)
Low-tesla MRI 1 3 5
High-tesla MRI 2 4 6
Note: This table visualizes how we dene the segment.
3.2.1 Patient Demand for MRI Scanning Services
We rst present the patients' demand for MRI scanning services in the downstream market.
Our model is closely related to the discrete choice models proposed by Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995) and used by Nevo (2001) and others. Ho (2006) and Ho (2009) applied
their methodology to the health economics literature to study the welfare eects of restricted
hospital choice in the U.S. and the determinants of hospital networks oered by managed
care health insurers, respectively. The indirect utility for patient i in market m choosing
medical institution j is dened by
uijm =
8<: log(ym   bt) + I
0
j + m + ijm; if j 6= 0
 log(ym) + i0m; otherwise;
where ym denotes the average income in market m, bt denotes the medical treatment price
that patients must pay for taking an MRI scan, Ij = (it1j;    ; itT ;j) denotes a vector of the
indicator variables when hospital j is type t, m denotes a region-specic random eect, and
ijm is a random utility shock.
14 The rst term expresses the mean utility per monetary unit,
while the second term expresses the utility from the segment to which medical institution
j belongs. The model also includes m to capture region-m-specic eects, as there might
be some region-specic factors, such as weather, food and other region-m-specic omitted
14As empirically studied by Iizuka (2012), there may exist agency problems and some demand might be
driven by physicians. (The latter is known as physician-induced demand.) However, such an aspect is out
of the scope of this paper due to the data limitations.
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variables that potentially aect the probability of becoming sick. All other idiosyncratic
factors are included in ijm.
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We specify consumer preference as a three-level nested logit model: potential patients
rst decide whether they will go to a hospital or not. Then, if they decide to go, they must
choose a segment sg and, nally, they must decide which hospital or clinic j to visit among
the medical institutions in segment sg. Mathematically, we assume that ijm is decomposed
into three parts:
ijm = "igm + (1  2)"i;sg;m + (1  1)"ijm;
where "igm corresponds to the rst decision, that of whether to go to a medical institution
or not, "i;sg;m is the segment-specic utility shock, and "ijm denotes the hospital or clinic
j-specic random utility shock. The rst nest captures the individual's state: healthy or
sick. Sickness corresponds to a high value of "igm. The second nest captures the seriousness
of the symptoms and diagnoses of patients. For example, a high value of "i;6;m leads to a high
demand for an MRI scan in a large hospital with a high-tesla MRI. The nal nest captures
the idiosyncratic heterogeneity in consumer preference within a given segment, such as the
distance to the hospital.
From a technical point of view, patients can go to any hospital in Japan. From a practical
point of view, however, it is not very common for patients to go to medical institutions in
other geographical markets. Therefore, the choice set for patient i living in market m is
denoted by Jim, and we include all available hospitals and clinics in market m. This market
denition, together with the previous indirect utility function specication, allows us to
dene the market share for medical institution j in market m in a given week as
sjm =
Z
Aj(;;)
f(")d"; with Aj(;;) = f"juijm  ujkm;8k 6= jg; (1)
where Ajm denotes the set of patients who choose medical institution j to provide MRI
scanning services and sjm denotes the market share for medical institutions j, which is
integral over population.
3.2.2 Medical Institutions' MRI Adoption
The prot maximization problem for medical institution j in market m is given by
max
ajm2f0;L;Hg
jm(ajm;~a jm);
15In other words, regardless of the identities of the medical institutions, patients derive exactly the same
mean utility from each segment to which medical institution j belongs.
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where ajm denotes an action and jm(ajm;~a jm) denotes a prot function that depends not
only on j's own action ajm but also on the actions of other medical institutions ~a jm in
the same geographical market. For each medical institution, ajm = 0 means that no MRIs
were purchased, and ajm = L or H means that a low- or high-tesla MRI was purchased,
respectively, i.e., our model endogenizes medical institutions' MRI choices upon entry, as in
Mazzeo (2002).16 The prot function for each medical institution j in market m is specied
as
jm(ajm;~a jm) =
8<:popm  sjm(ajm;~a jm)bt   ptm; if ajm 6= 0;0; otherwise;
where popm is the population in market m, which is observed in the data; sjm(ajm; a jm) is
the market share for j dened in equation (1); bt is the per-patient monetary transfer from
the insurer to a medical institution, which depends on the quality of MRI; and ptm is the
MRI price for segment t in market m. We normalize the prot for not adopting MRI as zero,
reecting the fact that medical institutions that do not have MRIs cannot earn any prot
from MRI-related services.17 On the other hand, medical institutions that purchase MRIs
can earn some prots: the revenue, the number of treated patients, popm  sjm(ajm;~a jm),
multiplied by the price per treatment, bt, minus the costs of adopting MRI technology,
summarized in ptm. We can rewrite the prot function using only the total number of
medical institutions that adopt MRI technology in each segment. Now the post-entry prot
function for a medical institution in segment t in market m is given by
~tm( ~Qm) = popm  stm( ~Qm)  bt;
where ~Q is a vector of total number of MRIs in each segment, i.e., ~Qm = (Q1m; Q2m;    ; Q6m).
This feature allows us to derive the inverse demand function for MRIs in market m. Given
the number of MRIs in other segments, medical institutions' willingness to pay for MRIs in
segment t must be identical to the post-entry prot and be decreasing in Qtm. Though the
existing literature often models the prot function in a reduced-form fashion, our model of
the downstream market enables us to express the post-entry prot in a structural fashion.
This approach allows us to conduct richer sets of counterfactual analyses.
16We assume that each medical institution purchases at most one MRI. In our data, 83% of them have
just one MRI. Moreover, even though 17% of them have multiple MRIs, some of them own a second MRI
for backup purposes or keep an old one due to high scrapping costs.
17There might be some indirect eects for not oering MRI scanning services, such as reputation \loss."
However, this eect is hard to quantify and the literature still has not found hard evidence of it. Therefore,
this model avoids dealing with such eects.
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As is clear from the expression, the model introduces strategic interaction among medical
institutions in a given geographical market, because many previous studies, such as Schmidt-
Dengler (2006) and Hashimoto and Bessho (2011), nd that there are business-stealing eects
in the MRI scanning service industry. If an additional entrant medical institution k adopts
MRI technology, the market share for the incumbent medical institutions would decrease.
This eect is called the business-stealing eects. The magnitude of this eect should depend
on the segments of medical institution k and of the incumbents. Our model allows for
heterogeneous business-stealing eects within and across segments in a given market,
One might worry about the heterogeneity of medical institutions within a segment, i.e.,
even within a given segment the degree of substitution could be dierent. For example, in the
segment comprised of large hospitals owning high-tesla MRIs, if two institutions are near to
each other, we would expect the substitution rate to be dierent than if the two institutions
were far away from each other. Such heterogeneity is intentionally omitted here in order to
keep our model tractable. Though models having such heterogeneity will better approximate
the reality, this heterogeneity enormously increases the state space. Our model uses only the
total number of medical institutions that adopt MRI technology in each segment. In this
sense, our adoption game as played by medical institutions is similar to the entry model of
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which assumes that rms are completely homogeneous. Our
model partially allows us to have heterogeneity by introducing segmentation and, more cru-
cially, when our segmentation becomes more detailed, our model approaches the model that
fully takes heterogeneity into account. Therefore, although our way of introducing strate-
gic interaction may look restrictive, this simplication dramatically reduces computational
complexity and can be easily extended to introduce more heterogeneity.18
As pointed out by Schmidt-Dengler (2006), medical institutions have an incentive to
adopt MRI technology in order to enhance their reputations and attract additional non-MRI
patients as well. In other words, adopting MRI technology has some externalities for other
illnesses and thus our normalization might no longer hold. However, this model allows such
an eect as well, because ptm can be seen as the real cost of adoption netting out all such
eects, rather than a nominal MRI price. Therefore, in essence, by observing (i) medical
institutions' adoption decisions, (ii) popm, and (iii) bt in our data, we recover the dierence
in prots that occurs medical institutions adopt (or do not adopt) MRI technology, which
is summarized in ptm. We further discuss this issue in the subsequent subsection where we
18For example, if we categorize the medical institutions into two groups { centrally located and non-
centrally located { we can increase the number of segments from six to twelve.
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discuss the marginal cost of MRI production.
3.2.3 Competition Among MRI Producers
Each manufacturer plays a Cournot competition in each segment of market m, meaning that
each rm solves the maximization problem
max
qf
f (qf ; q f );
where MRI manufacturer f 's prot is given by
f (qf ; q f ) =
X
m
fm(q1m;    ; qFm) =
X
m
X
t
qtfm(ptm  mctfm);
qf = (qf1;    ; qfM) and qfm = (qt1fm;    ; qt6fm) denote vectors of quantities that manu-
facturer f produces in each market and quantities that manufacturer f produces for each
segment t in market m, respectively, and mctfm denotes the marginal cost of producing
one unit of MRI for rm f in segment t in market m.19 As in the discussion of ptm, this
marginal cost captures the real cost of MRI production, netting out all costs and benets.
Alternatively, we could model all relevant eects and costs such as the privilege eects and
installation costs. However, the data only allows us to infer the dierence in prots with
and without the marginal MRI. Therefore, such eects cannot be separately identied. For
our counterfactual analysis, separate identication is not crucial because only the dierence
between the real cost of MRI production and the real benet of MRI adoption matters to
our welfare analysis.
In order to close the model, we make one more assumption on how the MRI prices are
determined. The demand function for MRIs, derived from the medical institutions' post-
entry prot, will be a step function, due to the discreteness of the number of MRIs. For
example, for a given Q tm, the inverse demand function for MRI in segment t would be
given by Figure 5. Suppose the manufacturers produce three MRIs for segment t in market
m. Then, there is a range of price that clears the market, denoted by (p3; p3]. If the price
is more than p3, then no more than two medical institutions can earn non-negative prot,
resulting in an oversupply of MRIs. If the price is lower than or equal to p3, at least four
19Although this quantity competition assumption might seem restrictive, we believe that, in this specic
industry, the model can achieve the same outcome by assuming price competition. Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) show that if there is a precommitment in production capacity, price competition leads to the same
outcome as quantity competition. In fact, production capacity cannot be easily adjusted in MRI production,
similar to machinery production in other industries, and this can be seen as precommitment in production
capacity.
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medical institutions can enter the market due to free entry, making non-negative prot,
which results in an undersupply of MRIs. If the price is in the range of (p3; p3], then three
medical institutions purchase MRIs, making non-negative prot, which clears the market.
However, there is still indeterminacy in price and we need to make one additional assumption
on how the MRI prices are determined.
Assumption 2 The prices for MRIs are determined by ptm = ~tm(
P
f qfm).
This assumption implicitly assumes that MRI manufacturers obtain full surplus and medi-
cal institutions earn exactly zero prot. For example, the price of an MRI in the previous
example in Figure 5 is equal to p3. This assumption can be justied if we put some specic
structures on the bargaining protocol among the MRI manufacturers and medical institu-
tions, such as that MRI manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it oers or medical institutions
purchase through uniform-price auction with complete information.
Figure 5: Implications for Zero Prot for Hospitals/Clinics
P
Q
P(Q)
  4321
p3
p3
Note: This gure illustrates the implications of the zero-
prot condition for medical institutions. P (Q) represents
the demand function for MRIs.
Here we assume constant marginal costs and specify that the marginal cost is decomposed
into two parts
mctfm = mctf + etfm;
where mctf denotes the deterministic part of the marginal cost and etfm denotes the stochas-
tic part of the marginal cost, which follows a normal distribution, N(0; 2e). To reduce the
number of parameters, we further put a specic function assumption on mctf : mctf =
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mcLf + mct for low-tesla MRIs and mctf = mc
H
f + mct for high-tesla MRIs. Note that we
allow the deterministic part of the marginal cost, mctf , to be dierent among segments. We
treat the marginal cost in this way to capture the net cost of MRI adoption. The MRI
purchase price is not the only cost hospitals pay; MRI installation also carries a cost. Also,
MRI adoption may have indirect benets to hospitals such as reputation enhancement. Since
we only observe medical institutions' adoption decisions and number of patients, what we
can infer from the data is the net cost of MRI adoption that includes all those costs and
benets. By allowing the marginal cost to be dierent depending on the segment, we allow
the possibility that those costs and benets may be dierent among medical institutions.
4 Empirical Implementation and Identication
There are three sets of parameters of interest: (i) the downstream demand parameters,
(; ; 1; 2), (ii) MRI manufacturers' marginal cost, fmctfgt=L;H;f=1; ;F , and (iii) two vari-
ances of distributional assumptions for the marginal cost 2" and the unobserved demand
2 . Let  denote the vector of the parameters of interest. Given the parameter values, the
model predicts two sets of moments: (a) market share for each hospital and clinic in the
downstream market, which enables us to identify (i) and one of the parameters in (iii), and
(b) market share for each MRI manufacturer, which enables us to identify (ii) and one of the
parameters in (iii). Roughly speaking, the latter set of moments contains the same informa-
tion as the adoption decisions of medical institutions. Essentially, there are two possible ways
to estimate our model: estimating all parameters jointly, and estimating the downstream
demand parameters rst and then the upstream cost parameters, separately. Although e-
ciency might be improved by employing the former approach, we take the second approach to
reduce computational complexity. More precisely, we rst estimate some of the downstream
demand-side parameters, 1 = (=(1  2); 2=(1  2);    ; 6=(1  2); (1  2)=(1  2)),
using the MRI utilization data, denoted by (a). Given the estimated parameters in the rst
stage, ^1, we construct the objective function with respect to the remaining parameters,
2 = (fmctfgt=1; ;6; 8f ; 2; ; "), and estimate these parameters using market shares for
MRI producers (or adoption decisions of medical institutions), denoted by (b).
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4.1 Estimating Demand Parameters
The demand estimation follows a standardized procedure.20 The nested logit structure in-
duces the following closed-form solution for the market share of each medical institution:
ln(sjm) =
 log(ym   bt) + Ij + m
1  2 +
1   2
1  2 log(within share in the segment)j
+Market-Specic Constant:
Based on this closed-form solution, our estimation equation can be rearranged as
ln(NPjm) =
 log(ym   bt) + Ij
1  2 +
1   2
1  2 log(wjm) + Fm + jm; (2)
where NPjm denotes the number of patients that clinic/hospital j treats per week, wjm
denotes the market share within the same segment, Fm is a market-specic xed eect and
jm denotes the error term.
21 This xed eect estimator gives us consistent estimates of

1 2 ,

1 2 and
1 2
1 2 and, more importantly, incorporates the possible measurement error in
the number of patients.22 Our model predicts that the number of patients for two medical
institutions in the same segment in a given market must be exactly the same. This is
not the case in the data, however, and we assume that the variations are attributed to the
measurement errors that are orthogonal to other variables, i.e., the number of patients in the
data must be equal to the number of patients predicted by the model plus the measurement
errors.
4.2 Estimating Upstream Supply Parameters
In the upstream market, the manufacturers compete in quantities and the quantities that
we observe in the data must satisfy the manufacturers' prot maximization condition
fm(qfm; q fm)  fm(q0fm; q fm) 8q0fm and 8f;
which means that no MRI manufacturer has an incentive to change its output, given the out-
put level of other manufacturers. In many markets, as shown in Section 2.2, qtfm ranges from
zero to 10 and this discreteness prevents us from using rst-order conditions to estimate this
20See Verboven (1996) for a detailed discussion and derivation of the nested logit model.
21In the model, all medical institutions in the same segment are ex ante identical and, therefore, the market
share within the segment is equal to the inverse of the number of clinics/hospitals in the same segment.
22We need not use instrumental variables for co-payments nor for the market share within a segment. As
co-payments are set by the government and market share within the segment here is deterministic number,
there are no worries for endogeneity in prices nor in the market share within the segment.
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model. Thus, instead of using rst-order conditions, we use inequality conditions to derive
the likelihood.23 Specically, the inequality condition is decomposed into two conditions:
fm(qfm; q fm)  fm((qtfm + 1; q tfm); q fm); (3)
fm(qfm; q fm)  fm((qtfm   1; q tfm); q fm): (4)
Rearranging inequality (3) gives us the intuitive inequality
mctfmz }| {
mctf + etfm  ptm((qtfm + 1; q tfm); q fm)
  qtfm[ptm(qm)  ptm((qtfm + 1; q tfm); q fm)]
  q tfm[p tm(qm)  p tm((qtfm + 1; q tfm); q fm)]:
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of producing an additional MRI, while the right-hand
side is the marginal revenue of producing an additional MRI, which is decomposed into three
terms. The rst term is the additional revenue from selling one more MRI in segment t at
the new price. The second term is the revenue loss from the decrease in the MRI price
in segment t. Holding other manufacturers' production constant, producing one additional
MRI leads to a decrease in the price in segment t and the new price will be applied to all
units sold in segment t. Thus, we need to multiply the original units sold by the dierence
between the old and new prices. The last term is the revenue loss from the decrease in MRI
prices in segments other than t. Because one additional MRI will be adopted in segment
t, medical institutions in other segments will face lower demand and thus their willingness
to pay for MRIs will be decreased. Therefore, the sum of these three terms is the marginal
revenue and, redening the right-hand side of inequality as MRtfm;+1, we obtain
etfm  MRtfm;+1  mctf : (5)
The other inequality (4) also yields a similar inequality condition and combining these
two conditions yields
MRtfm;+1  mctf  etfm  MRtfm; 1  mctf ; 8 t; f; and m:
23Our estimation procedure implicitly assumes that there is no multiplicity of equilibrium. Although
Cournot competition typically yields a unique equilibrium outcome, the discreteness of the number of MRIs
in our model potentially leads to a multiple equilibrium problem. However, when we compute equilibria
using the estimated model, manufacturers' production quantities are unique in more than 80% of the cases.
Even if the computed quantities are dierent in two dierent equilibria, the dierence is typically very small
{ just one or two units. Thus, we believe that multiplicity is not a serious issue in our model.
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If m is known, the inequality above enables us to calculate the likelihood
P (MRtfm;+1(m) mctf  etfm  MRtfm; 1(m) mctf ) ;
together with the normality assumptions for etfm. However, in this study, the unobserved
market-specic eect m cannot be fully recovered from the demand estimation due to the
measurement errors and the fact that we only observe the market share of 20% of medical
institutions. In principle, m can be inferred from both the downstream demand (the number
of patients) and the upstream demand (the number of medical institutions that purchase
MRIs). Thus, in order to integrate them out, we use simulated maximum likelihood. The
procedure is as follows. First, simulate an m-dimensional vector of , N times, denoted
by nseed and xed throughout this estimation procedure. Then, estimate the downstream
demand and obtain a set of parameters, ^1, that does not depend on the second stage. Then,
given 2, calculate the likelihood
P
 
MRtfm;+1(
n
seed) mctf  etfm  MRtfm; 1(nseed) mctf

and evaluate the log-likelihood of the data
Ln =
X
m
"X
f;t
logP
 
MRntfm;+1  mctf  etfm  MRntfm; 1  mctf
#
:
We repeat this procedure to nd the parameter that solves the maximization problem
^2;MLE = argmax
2
1
N
NX
n=1
Ln(2j^1): (6)
5 Results
5.1 Estimation Results
Demand parameters Table 3 shows the results for the rst-stage demand estimation.
The rst row presents the coecient for the logarithm of income minus price. As expected,
the estimation result for this coecient is positive and statistically signicant, implying that
the out-of-pocket expenditure negatively aects the demand for MRI scanning services. This
nding is consistent with the literature, e.g., Bhattacharya et al. (1996) and Shigeoka (2014),
who show that an increase in out-of-pocket expenditure reduces the demand for medical care
using the Japanese data. As 1 (the coecient for clinics with low-tesla MRI) is normalized
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to zero, 2 through 6 can be seen to represent consumers' preferences for each type of
clinic/hospital compared to clinics that own low-tesla MRIs. Our results indicate that small
hospitals with low-tesla MRIs are less preferred than clinics with low-tesla MRIs, whereas
other segment types are more preferred. In general, the estimated coecients suggest that
imaging with high-tesla MRIs is more appreciated by high-income patients, because s for
high-tesla MRI is high and the dierence in s is more important than the dierence in
co-payments for high-income patients relative to low-income patients when they make their
choices. This observation is consistent with Panel (b) in Figure 3. Knowing that high-income
patients have such strong appreciation for high-tesla MRIs, medical institutions tend to enter
the market by purchasing high-tesla MRIs in relatively wealthy markets.
Table 3: Demand Parameters
Estimates Std. Err.
=(1  2): log(Income - Price) 11.27 4.50
2=(1  2): Clinic with high MRI 1.57 0.34
3=(1  2): Small hospital with low MRI -0.24 0.14
4=(1  2): Small hospital with high MRI 1.37 0.36
5=(1  2): Large hospital with low MRI 0.475 0.13
6=(1  2): Large hospital with high MRI 1.80 0.31
Note: This table reports the xed-eect regression results for equation (2).
Signicance levels are denoted by (< 0:1);   (< 0:05); and   (< 0:01).
Cost parameters Given the demand estimates, the cost parameters are estimated and
demonstrated in Table 4. The estimated cost parameters, roughly speaking, reect the
market shares of the MRI producers, because the relative rankings of market share and
marginal cost correspond under Cournot competition. Thus, low market share should be
attributed to high marginal cost. GE, the company that has the largest market share for
high-tesla MRIs, has the lowest estimated marginal cost for high-tesla MRIs, while Hitachi,
the company that has the largest market share for low-tesla MRIs, has the lowest estimated
marginal cost for low-tesla MRIs. Other parameters are reported in Table 8 in Appendix B.
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Table 4: Estimates for Cost Parameters
High-Tesla MRI Low-Tesla MRI
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
G.E. 3.59 0.067 1.71 0.029
Siemens 3.75 0.069 2.15 0.039
Philips 3.99 0.072 2.33 0.043
Shimadzu 5.05 0.116 2.20 0.037
Toshiba 3.58 0.059 1.87 0.031
Hitachi 5.17 0.583 1.40 0.028
Note: This table reports the MLE estimates dened by (6).
The unit is translated to million Japanese Yen per week. Sig-
nicance levels are denoted by (< 0:1);   (< 0:05); and
  (< 0:01).
5.2 Policy Simulations
5.2.1 Decomposing the Eects of Regulation and Competition
We conduct three sets of counterfactual experiments to disentangle two components: the
eects of quantity regulation and taxation, and the eects of competition in the upstream
market. We rst briey explain what our counterfactual simulations are and provide further
details later when we show the results.
In the rst set of experiments, we begin by introducing French-style regulation on quan-
tity, whereby 7.5 MRIs are allowed for every one million people. As this number is extremely
small compared to the current Japanese number, which is close to 47 per million people, we
also allow this number to be 10 and 23 for every one million people, in order to illustrate how
the tightness of regulation aects consumer and producer surplus.24 Second, we introduce
a hypothetical sales tax on MRIs to reduce the medical arms race. As anecdotal evidence
shows that the MRI prices in Japan are about 25% lower than those in the U.S., our hy-
pothetical tax ratio is set to 30% to roughly approximate the prices in the U.S. The third
set of counterfactual experiments examines how the degree of upstream market competition
aects welfare. As the Japan Fair Trade Commission (2005) documented, the Japanese MRI
market is more competitive than that of other countries, possibly due to severe competition
among Japanese MRI producers. Thus, we rst reduce the eect of such competition by
merging three Japanese rms. Additionally, we also evaluate welfare under situations that
24German adoption regulation is set at about 10 MRIs per million residents, while 23 MRIs per million
residents roughly corresponds to one half of the current Japanese MRI adoption rate.
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allow for a cartel and for merging all six rms.
Table 5 summarizes the welfare implications for each case. The rst column, labeled CV,
shows compensating variation, which indicates how much consumers must be compensated
for being indierent between the current situation and the counterfactual one. On the other
hand, the second through the seventh columns show each MRI producer's surplus and the
eighth column sums them up. The ninth and tenth columns, under Government, show the
changes in insurer spending and tax revenue that result from imposing a sales tax. The
last column, labeled Social Welfare, sums up compensating variation and MRI producer
surplus. As the model imposes the zero-prot condition for hospitals, the prot for hospitals
in our model is zero by denition and thus is excluded from Table 5.25 Similarly, Table
6 summarizes the numbers of low- and high-tesla MRIs sold by each MRI manufacturer
under these counterfactual scenarios, while Table 7 demonstrates the utilization rate in each
counterfactual scenarios and the changes in the number of patients compared to the current
no regulation situation. In our data, the average utilization rates for low-tesla and high-tesla
MRIs are about 25% and 50%, respectively, and thus, in all scenarios except for quantity
regulation, we assume that the utilization rate cannot exceed 100%, which is four and two
times more than the current level, respectively.
25Alternatively, this MRI producer surplus can be seen as the sum of MRI producer surplus and medical
institution surplus. Social welfare is solely determined by MRI production quantity and would not be aected
by the surplus distribution among MRI producers and hospitals.
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Table 7: Capacity Utilization and Changes in the Number of Patients
Utilization Rate Number of Patients
Low High Low High Total
Regulation 7.5 88.2% 104.7% 73.6% 49.5% 57.4%
Regulation 10 74.6% 97.3% 78.6% 60.7% 66.5%
Regulation 23 42.5% 68.5% 92.1% 87.1% 88.7%
Tax 30% 35.0% 70.8% 108.9% 93.0% 98.2%
JPN Merger 27.3% 53.9% 88.8% 103.5% 98.7%
Monopoly 76.4% 94.0% 204.5% 8.0% 72.0%
Cartel 52.3% 76.4% 87.9% 76.3% 80.1%
Note: This table summarizes capacity utilization and changes in the number of patients
for each counterfactual scenario. The rst and second columns show the utilization rates
for low- and high-tesla MRIs, respectively. First we calculate the proportional change,
compared to the model prediction, and then multiply by the utilization rates in the data
to obtain the utilization rates for each counterfactual scenario. The third through fth
columns represent the number of patients, compared to the model prediction.
Introduction of French-style regulation We rst examine the eects of introducing
French-style regulation. The second through fourth rows depict the results for regulation
specifying 7.5, 10 and 23 MRIs per million people, respectively. The procedure of this policy
experiment is as follows: we rst calculate the number of MRIs that should be allocated in
each geographical market. If the data indicates that the actual number of MRIs is greater
than this hypothetical number, we then shrink the market while xing the market shares
constant, i.e., we proportionally reduce each MRI producer's production amount. Thus,
roughly speaking, the market share must be the same as the rst row, though there might
be some dierences due to the integer problem.
There are two important observations in these results. First of all, introduction of French-
style quantity regulation would increase social welfare in all cases. These welfare gains come
largely from the increase in producer surplus: in all cases, the MRI manufacturers would
reduce their production amounts and be able to charge much higher prices for MRIs, which
would drive up their prots. On the other hand, due to the decrease in the number of medical
institutions that adopt MRIs, patients' choice sets would shrink substantially, resulting in
a lower consumer surplus. In fact, this decrease in consumer surplus is not only driven by
the shrinkage of choice sets, but also driven by the fact that some potential patients decide
not to go to medical institutions. For example, only 57.4% of the current patients would
32
go to the medical institutions under Regulation 7.5, according to the last column in Table
7.26 Thus the Japanese government must compensate consumers to maintain their current
utility level. Overall, the former welfare gain in producer surplus exceeds the latter welfare
loss in consumer surplus, as business-stealing eects in the downstream market are very
severe in the current situation. This rst observation essentially tells us that the current
Japanese laissez-faire policy on MRI adoption results in excessive adoption of MRIs and
social ineciency.
The second observation is that tighter regulation might not necessarily enhance social
welfare. When comparing the three regulation levels, the middle one, Regulation 10, achieves
the highest social welfare. This observation is particularly important as it points out a
limitation of regulation. There is no doubt that the current number of MRIs under laissez-
faire policy is not optimal. At the same time, tight regulation such as Regulation 7.5
would not provide optimal allocation either. There must exist a level of regulation between
7.5 (French regulation) and 23 (roughly half of the current number of MRIs per million
people in Japan) that maximizes social welfare. Therefore, when designing regulation, the
government must recognize such a trade-o between consumer and producer surplus and
choose an optimal level of regulation.
Introduction of a Sales Tax Another possible policy intervention that could help miti-
gate the excess adoption of MRIs is direct taxation of MRI sales. As expected, the number
of MRIs, consumer surplus and producer surplus would decrease. However, the tax revenue
would exceed the sum of these decreases, meaning that this policy could potentially achieve
a Pareto-improving allocation by redistributing the tax revenue to producers and consumers.
Moreover, note that the decrease in the number of patients is only about 1.8% according to
Table 7. Thus, the decrease in consumer surplus is mostly due to the shrinkage of the choice
sets rather than the decrease in the number of total patients taking MRI scans.
One important distinction between our paper and the existing literature on free entry is
that the tax pass-through rate hinges on the market structure in the upstream market. In
the case of perfect competition in the upstream market, the sales tax on MRIs will be fully
reected in the price. However, in the case of monopoly or oligopoly, only some fraction of
the tax will be passed, because the monopolistic rm or oligopolistic rms can adjust their
quantities. Therefore, when designing policies in vertical markets, policy makers must take
26Note that, in the case of Regulation 7.5, the utilization rate for high-tesla MRIs is slightly above 100%,
indicating that the capacity constraint would be violated. Thus, the medical institutions might need to
operate a little bit longer to implement this hypothetical regulation.
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into account the vertical structure of the industry.
Softening Competition in the Upstream Market Finally, we study the impacts of
changing the degree of upstream market competition. To illustrate the importance of the
degree of upstream market competition, we consider three counterfactual scenarios. First,
we merge three Japanese rms together (see JPN Merge, the sixth row of Table 5). Under
this scenario, the merged rm would employ the best production technology available among
the three Japanese rms in each market. In the second scenario, we allow all rms to collude
to maximize the industry prot (see Cartel, the seventh row of Table 5). When working
as a cartel, given the current market share, rms proportionally reduce their production
amounts to maximize the industry prot, which is referred to as Proportional Reduction by
Schmalensee (1987). The last scenario allows the merging of all six rms into a monopolist in
the upstream market (see Monopoly, the eighth row of Table 5). A newly merged monopolist
would be able to employ the best production technology for each market, i.e., the rm that
has the lowest marginal cost, including stochastic shocks, produces all high-/low-tesla MRIs
for each market. Notice that the dierence between Cartel and Monopoly is whether there is
an eciency gain from production reallocation. In the case of a monopoly, the merged rm
can employ the best technology and thus reallocate the production to the most ecient rms,
whereas, in the case of a cartel, every rm must produce MRIs regardless of the eciency of
their technologies and there are no eciency gains from product reallocation.
In all cases, softening competition in the upstream market would increase social welfare,
although all such exercises are considered to be anti-competitive. The basic mechanism is
similar to the introduction of quantity regulation in the downstream market. As the current
number of MRIs in Japan is excessive, reducing the number of MRIs mitigates business-
stealing eects and results in higher social welfare. Softening competition would allow MRI
manufacturers to increase their mark-ups, which would discourage adoption of MRIs by
medical institutions. Notice that as the degree of upstream market competition is softened
from the current situation to JPN Merger, Cartel and Monopoly, social welfare increases.
The softer the competition in the upstream market, the more MRI manufacturers internalize
the business-stealing eects in the downstream market when they decide how many MRIs
to produce.
In the case where three Japanese rms are merged, the total number of MRIs would
dramatically decrease, as indicated in Table 6. This total number of MRIs is slightly larger
than the number of MRIs per million people in the U.S. Notably, as demonstrated in Table
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6, the number of low-tesla MRIs would substantially decrease in this case, triggering an
increase in high-tesla MRI production by foreign rms, in particular, Siemens and Philips.
In this way, there would be a shift from low- to high-tesla MRIs and consumers who prefer
high-tesla MRIs would be better o, whereas some consumers who prefer low-tesla MRIs
would be worse o. Therefore, the decrease in consumer welfare would be relatively small,
given the large decrease in the number of MRIs.
A comparison of the results for the Cartel and Monopoly highlights the reallocation
eect. In Table 6, when working as a cartel, MRI manufacturers produce more low-tesla
MRIs than high-tesla MRIs, as they cannot reallocate their productions. In the case where
all manufacturers are merged, the merged MRI manufacturers would produce even more
low-tesla MRIs than high-tesla MRIs, further internalizing the business-stealing eect among
medical institutions in the downstream market. In other words, under the case of monopoly,
the merged rm is able to charge high prices by reducing the production quantity and
increasing utilization rates as in Table 7, whereas currently MRIs are not fully utilized by
medical institutions and the MRI manufacturers cannot charge such high prices.
Finally we would like to emphasize the importance of regulated medical treatment prices.
Dating back to 2008, the dierence in MRI scanning and associated prices for high- and low-
tesla MRI is relatively small. Thus, if a medical institution can fully utilize the purchased
MRI, the maximum revenues from high- and low-tesla MRIs are not so dierent from the
medical institutions' point of view. Knowing this, under the case of monopoly, the merged
monopolist tends to produce low-tesla MRI, because the production cost for low-tesla MRIs
is much lower than that for high-tesla MRIs and the merged monopolist can fully internalize
the business-stealing eect in the downstream market. Therefore, the design of the medical
treatment prices may also aect the medical arms races. This could be a good topic for
future research.
6 Conclusion
The recent increases in health care expenditures have led to the intense scrutiny of ineciency
arising from the medical arms race. Although the literature attempts to identify the existence
of such ineciencies, there are few papers that attempt to quantify the welfare implications.
This paper, therefore, develops and estimates a tractable model of the medical arms race,
and quanties the welfare loss caused by the medical arms race in the context of MRI
adoption. Specically, we model the medical arms race with free entry (no regulation of
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MRI adoption) of medical institutions and nd that regulation or introduction of a sales tax
helps restore eciency. Furthermore, our model also allows us to quantify how competition
in the upstream market aects social welfare. Unlike a common antitrust argument, in an
industry with a vertical structure, softening the competition does not necessarily reduce
social welfare. These ndings shed light on a mechanism that determines how medical arms
races result in social ineciency and oer new insight into antitrust policies in industries
with vertical structure.
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Appendix A.1 Assumptions in Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
Assumption MW1. Nq(N) > N^q(N^) for all N > N^ and limN!1Nq(N) = M < 1 for
some constant M .
Assumption MW2. q(N) < q(N^) for all N > N^ .
Assumption MW3. P (Nq(N))  c0d(q(N))  0 for all N where P (Q) denotes the inverse
demand function in the nal good market and P 0(Q) < 0.
Appendix A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
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When Nu = 1, then
@W
@Nu
=  @Qu
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> 0:
Also, if pu = K, then
dpu
dQu
qu = 0 and, therefore,
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=
@Qu
@Nu
Qu
@q(Qu)
@Qu
(P (Quq(Qu))  c0(q(Qu)))  0;
with strict inequality if P (Quq(Qu))  c0(q(Qu)) > 0.
Appendix B Remaining Estimated Parameters
Table 8: Estimates for other parameters
Estimates Std. Err.
First Stage Parameters
(1   2)=(1  2): First Stage Nest 0.03 0.09
Second Stage Parameters
0: Constant in the indirect utility -5.56
 0.11
2: Lower nest parameter 0.95
 0.001
mc3: Small hospitals with low-tesla specic cost 3.84
 0.93
mc4: Small hospitals with high-tesla specic cost 0.37
 0.01
mc5: Large hospitals with low-tesla specic cost -2.28
 0.59
mc6: Large hospitals with high-tesla specic cost 0.41
 0.11
H" : Variance for low-tesla MRI 0.63
 0.01
L" : Variance for high-tesla MRI 0.94
 0.17
: Variance for market random eects 11.49
 0.76
Note : This table summarizes the remaining estimation results. The rst stage results come from
the xed-eect regression results for equation (2) and the second stage results come from the MLE
estimates dened by (6). The unit is in thousand Japanese Yen per week for mc3, mc4, mc5 and mc6
and million Japanese Yen per week for ". Signicance levels are denoted by (< 0:1);   (< 0:05);
and   (< 0:01).
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